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This paper introduces Home Appreciation Participation Notes (HAPNs), an 
innovative new housing finance tool. Housing is a commodity providing two 
distinct utilities: shelter and investment. Traditionally, buyers have had to 
purchase both elements in tandom. HAPNs allow buyers to purchase these 
elements individually. Thus, buyers can focus on purchasing housing units 
that best fit their shelter needs, investing in housing appreciation to whatever 
extent is appropriate for the needs of their investment portfolio. 
 
HAPNs are different from previous financing tools in three key ways: there is 
no payment burden until ownership of the home is transferred, the risk of 
housing price declines is shifted to investors, and the final payoff is indexed 
to the appreciation rates of local housing prices. With these three features, 
HAPNs considerably improve the affordability of homeownership while 
reducing the risk of default and avoiding the moral hazard associated with 
shared appreciation instruments. 
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HAPNs thus have important implications in today’s worldwide housing and 
financial downturn. First, they can be used as an effective loss-mitigation tool 
against delinquent mortgages. Converting a delinquent traditional mortgage 
into a HAPN financing structure can simultaneously reduce the payment 
burden and the current loan-to-value ratio. This, in turn, can help to avoid 
default and foreclosure. They can be also useful in stimulating housing 
transactions during housing recessions. Because homebuyers avoid the risk 
of decreases in housing prices, they will be more willing to purchase homes 
in the face of an uncertain housing market. This feature will bolster demand 
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The housing crisis in the United States has been one of the primary causes of the 
current worldwide economic downturn. In response to this crisis, we have seen 
unprecedented recovery efforts by governments, which have been spending trillions 
of dollars in a desperate attempt to avoid another Great Depression. A critical focus 
has been on the efficient use of government funds, which is generally seen as an 
attempt to effect the most rapid and sustained recovery possible per dollar expended, 
while creating a future return for taxpayers. 
 
In the housing sector, we have seen speculative investors over the last decade or 
more create housing bubbles and cause a housing shortage in some areas. As a result, 
housing values grew too fast, making home ownership unaffordable for many 
households. The rapidly rising prices enticed many others to purchase houses at 
unsustainable prices that they were barely able to support. Broadly marketed 
mortgage products made it easy for borrowers to finance homes using loans that 
lowered current payments while shifting more risk to the borrower than ever before 
(e.g., teaser rate adjustable mortgages with the potential for negative amortization). 
 
Zero or low down payment loans allowed buyers to purchase homes with little or no 
equity in them. Making matters worse, there was little or no verification of a buyer’s 
ability to repay the loan. When housing prices started falling, interest rates rose, and 
credit to the housing market dried up. The number of mortgage defaults rapidly 
increased, especially through the securitization products based on mortgages. This 
has resulted in many people losing their homes and their life savings. The turmoil 
has spread to other financial markets, as well. 
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In this paper, we introduce Home Appreciation Participation Notes (HAPNs)
  1, a 
housing finance instrument that can significantly reduce mortgage default rates and 
increase the amount of capital available to the housing sector. As a result, they can 
stimulate the recovery of the housing sector. 
 
HAPNs have several characteristics that can improve the efficiency of the housing 
finance market, contributing to the avoidance of a repeat of the current crisis. They 
can: 
•  Allow a better diversification of homeowner investment portfolios, 
markedly reducing the concentration of risk typically associated with 
homeownership; 
•  Allow the risk of house price appreciation (HPA) to be shifted away from 
homeowners to entities that are more capable of bearing and managing it; 
•  Make housing much more affordable; and 
•  Substantially reduce the default risk incurred by lenders. 
 
In addition to having long-term benefits for the housing finance market, HAPNs can 
also play a major role in resolving the current financial crisis by providing a 
mechanism for working out nonperforming mortgages, avoiding default on these 
loans, and allowing the borrowers to maintain ownership of their homes. 
 
Owner-occupied housing typically provides buyers with both consumption and 
investment elements. An owner/occupier purchasing a home obtains the 
consumption rights to that home, including occupancy, exclusion, and alteration 
rights. For most buyers, an owner-occupied home is their largest asset, their cheapest 
form of financing, and their most leveraged form of debt. HAPNs have been 
developed to allow the separation of the two elements of owner-occupied housing by 
allowing buyers to retain the consumption element while essentially capitalizing the 
investment value of the home and selling it along with its risk to another investor. 
The less of the investment element the buyer retains, the more affordable the house 
becomes. The amount of HPA risk is also lowered. 
 
With regard to the two elements of housing, there are basically four types of 
homebuyers – those that: 
 
•  Want both the consumption and investment opportunities embedded in 
traditional house financing products; 
•  Want the consumption element, but would like only part of the investment 
element so as to diversify their investment portfolio; 
•  Are interested only in consumption, not in investment, perhaps to maximize 
the amount of housing they can consume currently; and 
•  Are currently renters that would like to own a home but cannot afford do to. 
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The first type of homebuyer would presumably not be interested in HAPNs. The 
other three types, however, could benefit significantly from them. 
 
We start by introducing HAPNs. We then discuss their unique features. After that, 
we describe how they can serve as an affordable home-buying tool and the potential 
role they can play in resolving the current economic crisis by allowing distressed 
homeowners to remain in their homes and also by encouraging house sales in the 





A HAPN is a separate financial instrument used in conjunction with a traditional 
mortgage. The homebuyer sells the HAPN to a separate investor, and the proceeds 
from the sale are substituted for a portion of the principal amount of the homebuyer’s 
mortgage. This reduces the amount of his or her mortgage. Thus, the homebuyer has 
essentially received payment for the capitalized expected HPA at the time of 
purchase and has transferred the risk and/or reward potential of future housing price 
movements to the HAPN investor. 
 
The HAPN is essentially a zero-coupon bond. HAPN investors purchase rights to the 
future HPA, receiving nothing in return until the title of the house is transferred. 
When this happens, they receive the portion of the HPA that was purchased. If the 
price of the house declines (in the event of a negative HPA), they suffer that loss (up 
to the amount of the initial price of the HAPN). 
 
Upon the disposition of the house, the payoff to the investor is computed based on 
the difference between the initial and the final local housing price index. The actual 
sales price of the underlying house is not used to avoid the moral hazard associated 
with this approach. Thus, the HAPN has an indefinite maturity based on the change 
in ownership of the house. It is a second lien on the house after the primary 
mortgage. This is a very important issue and is discussed in more detail in the next 
section of this paper. 
 
HAPNs could be configured in various ways, depending on the needs of homebuyers 
and investors. In this paper, we use an example of how a HAPN could be configured 
to benefit both homebuyers and investors while at the same time fulfilling public 
policy objectives. With this type of HAPN, investors would assure homeowners of a 
1% per year increase in the value of their homes. Investors would assume any risk or 
benefit depending on whether there was any deviation from this amount. 
 
Investors would pay homeowners for this right, and the amount paid would become a 
bullet mortgage on the house with no associated monthly payments. The HAPN 
would be settled when homeowners sell their houses. If the HPA is greater than 1% 
per year, the investor would be paid the excess of that amount in addition to the face 
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make up the difference, which would be taken out of the par value of the bullet 
mortgage upon the sale of the home. The bullet mortgage, thus, is a performance 
bond. The investor’s liability for the downside loss would be limited to the par value 
of the HAPN. 
 
3. Unique  Features  
 
This section discusses the unique features of HAPNs that enhance their usefulness to 
homeowners and investors relative to similar instruments. We note four primary 
features that are unique to HAPNs: 
 
•  They rely on an index to measure HPA to mitigate the moral hazard; 
•  They are zero-coupon bonds; 
•  Investors purchasing them take the risk of housing price decreases; and 
•  Their maturity is tied to the sale of the house not the payoff of the loan. 
 
3.1  The HPI is used to mitigate the moral hazard 
 
Determining the amount of HPA to be paid to the HAPN investor is key to making 
HAPNs an efficient and effective instrument. Traditionally, shared appreciation 
mortgages (SAMs), which allow the mortgage lender to receive part of the HPA, 
have faced this challenge. The major problem that must be addressed is the moral 
hazard, which arises when the sales price is used to compute how much of the HPA 
is to be shared with investors. This was eloquently discussed with regard to SAMs 
by Shiller and Weiss (1998). 
 
The moral hazard refers to the incentives for homeowners under a SAM contract to 
under invest in a home because the investor will take a percentage of the increase in 
value and also arrange to have the final sales price lower than it would be otherwise. 
If the appreciation were to be measured by an area House Price Index (HPI) instead 
of the appraised value or sales price, they argue, the investment that the homeowner 
makes in the house would not be reflected in the settlement of the SAM. In other 
words, it would be as if the SAM did not exist as an incentive for the homeowner. 
 
Shiller and Weiss (2000) estimate that underinvestment with a 50-50 partnership
2 
would cause the sales price to decline by 5% to 9% after eight years. Sanders and 
Slawson (2005) estimate that if homeowners under-invested at a rate of 5% per year, 
they would receive a 17% higher than expected return on their housing investment 
when sharing 75% of the appreciation with the lender. Thus, both Shiller and Weiss 
and Sanders and Slawson perceive underinvestment as a serious problem. 
 
The use of HPIs to measure the appreciation owed to the SAM would obviate the 
moral hazard by making the SAM payoff independent of the value of the specific 
 
2 A partnership is equivalent to the HAPN because the HAPN shares in the decrease in price. Cassidy, Dennis, and Yang    131 
 
house. One of the key features of HAPNs is the use of an index to measure the HPA 
to be shared with investors instead of using the selling or the appraised price of the 
house. 
 
Using HPIs as an index is not without pitfalls. There is the basis risk that the change 
in value of the home would be different from the change in value of the HPI, and this 
would produce a disproportionate loss or profit for homeowners. For example, if the 
change in the HPI indicated that the investor was owed $50,000, but the house had 
actually sold for less, homeowners would be hard-pressed to make up the difference 
out of their own pockets. Offsetting this risk is the HAPN configuration used above 
whereby the homeowner is promised a 1% per year HPA. This would serve as a 
cushion to offset basis risk. 
 
HPIs are readily available indices so implementation would be straightforward. 
Other indices, such as estimates of housing prices from Automated Valuation 
Models (AVMs) and “desk appraisals,” would also be attractive alternatives. Not 
only are AVMs likely to have a lower basis risk than HPIs, there are ways to use 
them that would further reduce the risk. The AVM that is used for the initial 
estimate, for example, could be “frozen” so that subsequent refinements to the model 
were not used. In this way, even though the initial estimate might be low, the final 
estimate would be proportionately low. In this way, the HPA estimate would be 
unbiased. 
 
The attributes of the house that were used in the initial AVM estimate, such as the 
amount of living space (a variable used in most AVMs to estimate value), could be 
frozen, as well. By so doing, changes such as home improvements would not be 
included in the final AVM estimate. This would allow the homeowner to reap the 
entire enhancement in sales price induced by those improvements. Thus, the 
incentive for making the improvements would remain the same as if traditional 
financing were used. 
 
A desk appraisal could achieve the same result as AVMs by basing the final estimate 
of the value of a house on comparable home sales in the area without reference to 
any changes in the house itself since the initiation of the HAPN contract. Sometimes 
called a “desktop review,” a desk appraisal gives the appraiser information on the 
attributes of a house based only on its initial appraisal. An estimate of its value at the 
time of sale is based on what comparable houses have been sold for. The current 
condition of the house is not taken into consideration. This has the effect of freezing 
the initial attributes of the house and avoiding the moral hazard. It also would be the 
easiest index to use in terms of developmental costs. This approach would be 
particularly feasible for markets where neither a public HPI nor a reliable AVM 
exists. 
 
Whichever index is selected for a HAPN, the important point is that affordability is 
enhanced because investors would pay more for a share of house appreciation if they 
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3.2  HAPNs as zero-coupon bonds 
 
As noted above, a HAPN is a separate instrument that has a zero-coupon and no 
amortization payments whereas most SAMs include a monthly payment. This feature 
plays a critical role in the contribution that HAPNs could make toward making 
housing more affordable. While SAMs use the value of the transferred HPA to 
reduce the interest rate, HAPNs turn the capitalized value of sold HPA rights into a 
reduction in the principal amount financed by the interest-bearing, amortizing 
mortgage. Thus, they reduce the monthly payment for the house by a much greater 
amount than do traditional SAMs. 
 
3.3  HAPN investors take the risk of housing price decreases 
 
By investing in HAPNs, investors assume the risk of housing price decreases instead 
of homeowners. The SAM proposed by Caplin et al (2008) and most other existing 
SAMs do not have investors sharing in negative HPA. If HAPN investors shared in 
the downside, then homeowner equity would remain positive for wide downward 
swings in the HPA. Defaults would also be much less likely. As a result, 
homeowners would be more likely to stay in their houses through down cycles. This 
would result in fewer foreclosed houses being put on the market. Thus, recoveries – 
a current public policy objective – could take place faster. If HAPNs became 
widespread, this would help in the next housing decline. 
 
This feature would also make HAPNs an attractive financing vehicle during the 
current housing recession. Buyers might be reluctant to buy homes in such a market 
if they were afraid of losing their initial equity should housing prices continue their 
downward spiral. Because HAPN investors would be the ones bearing the downside 
risk, homebuyers would be less likely to put off buying homes. This would increase 
current demand and consequently accelerate the housing recovery. In the interest of 
affordability (i.e., because it would affect the amount investors are currently willing 
to pay for HAPNs), there might be a need to set limitations on the amount of 
downward exposure investors could take on, such as limitations on investors sharing 
in the downside if the house were sold within a short period of time – for example, 
within three years. If the market declined after the purchase took place, homeowners 
would know that they would be protected by the HAPN if they delayed their sale 
until this “grace period” had been reached. This would reduce the supply of housing 
available for sale during a housing downturn, which would help relieve some of the 
pressures on the housing market. 
 
The ultimate limit of downside protection with HAPNs is the face value of the 
HAPN bullet mortgage. That is, HAPN investors can lose – at most – their initial 
investment. The HAPN mortgage is, then, the performance bond for negative HPA. 
The amount of the negative HPA would be deducted from the face value of the 
HAPN until the entire face value is exhausted. 




3.4  HAPN maturity is tied to the sale of the house 
 
Unlike with traditional mortgages, in their basic form, HAPNs cannot be freely 
prepaid. While some homebuyers might want clauses in their contracts that allow for 
prepayment prior to the sale of the house, this would be viewed negatively by 
investors and lower the HAPNs market value. During a housing recession such as 
what is now taking place, the right to prepay HAPNs after housing prices fell, and 
were about to rise again, would discourage investors from entering into HAPNs 
contracts or paying any significant amount for them. Only when investors have a 
strong expectation of obtaining what they consider a “normal” real estate return 
would they be willing to pay enough for HAPNs to have beneficial effects on the 
affordability of housing. Another advantage of not allowing prepayments is that 
investors would then not have to face prepayment risks or the complex analytics and 
econometrics necessary to address these risks. 
 
To encourage homeowners to issue HAPNs, it might be necessary to make it 
possible for them to prepay. For various reasons, such as an increase in homeowners’ 
income or wealth, they might be interested in calling back outstanding HAPNs. If 
HAPNs became a liquidly traded security, homeowners could easily offset their 
position by purchasing another one in the open market, allowing them to “prepay” 
indirectly. It might be advantageous to let homeowners prepay HAPNs under certain 
conditions, such as after five years and then making them callable at subsequent 
anniversaries. Such a Bermuda call provision might provide the desired flexibility to 
homeowners without having a substantial impact on the market value of HAPNs. 
 
In the reference section below, we cite a number of references that advocate 
instruments that appear to be more advantageous than traditional SAMs. Only Shiller 
and Weiss (1998, 2000), Liu (2007), and Oppenhiemer (1997) suggest the use of an 
index to compute the HPA and avoid the moral hazard of SAMs. None of them use 
AVMs or desk appraisals. Moreover, they do not have the other unique features of 
HAPNs, and they are not as effective in enhancing affordability or protecting 
homeowners from the risk of house prices falling. 
 
 
4.  Market Value of HAPNs 
 
The market value that an investor is willing to pay for a HAPN varies with the 
investor’s expectation of the local HPA and the homebuyer’s tenure. Following the 
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where V is the market value of the HAPN, k is the risk-adjusted return required by 
the investor, f(t) is the probability density function that the house will be sold at time 
t, and E(CFt) is the expected HAPN payoff if the house is sold at time t, which 
includes the expected house appreciation and the repayment of the par value (the 
initial HAPN price). 
 
Using the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) house price 
indices, Cho, Lin, and Yang (2008b) estimated the long-term average HPA in the 
United States as ranging from 3.8% to 8.5%, with an average of 5.5%. The average 
tenure of homeownership in the U.S. typically ranges from four to eight years. In 
Table 1, we estimate the market values of the HAPN as a percentage of the house 
value under different parameter combinations. The version of the HAPN being 
priced is the one described above, whereby the homeowner is guaranteed 1% per 
year appreciation. 
 
Table 1  Market Value of the HAPN as a Percentage of Initial House Value 
   Tenure in Years 
k  E(HPA) 4  8  12 
 3.0% 23  20  18 
8% 5.5%  53  50  46 
 8.0% 86  84  82 
 3.0% 18  15  13 
10% 5.5%  41  37 33 
 8.0% 67  63  59 
 3.0% 14  12  9 
12% 5.5%  34  29  24 
 8.0% 54  49  43 
 
The pattern found in Table 1 is quite intuitive. The HAPN value is higher when the 
expected HPA is higher and when the required return by the investor is lower. The 
market value also decreases as the tenure of the homeownership becomes longer. In 
the real world, investors are likely to incorporate the housing cycle into the HPA. As 
a result, the HAPN value will likely vary throughout the business cycle. The 
investors are also likely to assign probabilities among different tenure years. We use 
the HAPN value of 37% of the underlying housing value (k = 10%, E(HPA) = 5.5%, 
Tenure = 8 years) for numerical examples in the rest of the paper. 
 
 
5.  HAPNs Improve Homeownership Affordability 
 
Most homeowners would need a greater amount of financing than just the HAPN. 
When a homeowner buys a house with a traditional mortgage and a HAPN, we Cassidy, Dennis, and Yang    135 
 




Figure 1 compares the typical HAPN structure with traditional financing and with a 
5% down payment on a US$300,000 house.  
 




$  15K: downpay
+) $110K: HAPN
$240K: 1st mrtg
$  45K: 2nd mrtg
$  15K: downpay
$300K: House $300K: House
 
 
The traditional financing is assumed to be a first mortgage of $240,000 and a second 
mortgage of $45,000, with interest rates of 6% and 12%, respectively. Without 
losing generality, we assume interest-only payments. At a 36% payment-to-income 
ratio (PTI), the borrower needs to have an annual income of at least $55,000 to 
afford this type of traditional financing package. 
 
The right-hand side shows the HAPN financing. Following Table 1, we assume that 
HAPN investors would pay $110,000 ($300,000 times 37%) for the HAPN. With the 
same $15,000 down payment, the homebuyer would only need to borrow a first 
mortgage of $175,000. Assuming the same 6% interest rate as in the traditional 
example, the annual mortgage payment would be only $10,500. Because there would 
be no monthly payments for the $110,000 HAPN bullet mortgage, this would be the 
entire mortgage payment that the borrower would need to pay annually. Thus, using 
a HAPN, the payment burden would be reduced by 47% relative to traditional 
financing. Using the same 36% PTI as before, the income requirement would be 
$29,200, or 47% less than with the traditional financing.
4  
 
                                                 
3 Other subsequent liens are possible, e.g., for home improvements, subject to the approval of 
the HAPN investors. 
4 Note that if there were no second mortgage in the traditional case, there would be mortgage 
insurance premiums and if there were risk-based pricing on the first mortgage, the mortgage 
rate would be higher in the traditional case. The reduction in the required income with the 
HAPN financing could be even greater than 47%. The amortization component of payments 
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This example demonstrates an important feature of HAPNs: affordability. Another 
important feature is that HAPN investors would accept the housing price risks 
associated with home ownership. Risks are often associated with negative results, but 
in economic terms, they can lead to both negative and positive outcomes. It is the 
downside risk that many homeowners are not capable of handling – as we painfully 
see today with the high foreclosure rates and the loss of lifetime savings in some 
cases. We compare the hypothetical results if home ownership is transferred after 
two years of declining housing prices. Figure 2 shows the result of the traditional and 
HAPN financing packages with a decrease in the HPA of 5% per year. 
 





$  21K: Equity
+) $  75K: HAPN
____
$240K: 1st mrtg
$  31K: 2nd mrtg
$    0K: Equity
$271K - House $271K: House
 
 
In Figure 2, the house price drops to $271,000. For the traditional mortgage, the 
homeowner’s equity would be wiped out and so would $15,000 of the second 
mortgage. This negative equity position would create the likelihood of default. If the 
borrower’s income decreased or the payment of the traditional first mortgage rose,
5 
this could very well be the stress that triggered the default. 
 
On the other hand, in the HAPN case, HAPN investors would absorb all the negative 
HPA, plus the 1% per year promised return to the homeowner. The intrinsic value of 
the HAPN would fall to $75,000 while the homeowner's equity would actually 
increase to $21,000. So default would be very unlikely.
6 This scenario highlights one 
of the primary advantages for homeowners – the ability to stay in their houses even 
in a severe housing recession because it is the HAPN investor that assumes the 
downside risk. As mentioned earlier, many homeowners are not capable of bearing 
this risk. When they start defaulting on their mortgages, there can be serious chain 
reactions, further worsening the housing downturn. 
 
                                                 
5 For example, if either or both of the first and second mortgages were adjustable rates, the 
payment would increase with rising market interest rates or the expiration of the initial teasers. 
6 It is possible to incorporate a clause to prevent HAPN investors from paying the 1% return 
when the actual HPA is negative. Even with such a clause, the homeowner’s equity would 
remain positive, the same as the initial down payment. Default would be highly unlikely to 
occur. Cassidy, Dennis, and Yang    137 
 
Needless to say, the reason that HAPN investors would be willing to risk a decline in 
housing prices is that they could also benefit from an increase in the price of 
housing. Figure 3 shows the results of the traditional and HAPN financing packages 
for an increase in HPA of 16% per year for two years. 
 




$  21K: Equity
+) $208K: HAPN
$240K: 1st mrtg
$  45K: 2nd mrtg
$119K: Equity
$404K: House $404K: House
 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that homeowners receive downside risk protection from 
HAPNs. Figure 3 shows that homeowners give up the potential for gain in exchange 
for the initial affordability. Their equity under traditional financing would grow to 
$119,000, but it would remain at the promised $21,000 under HAPN financing. On 
the other hand, the HAPN investors would receive $208,000 and a 37% annual return 
to compensate them for assuming the downside risk of HPA. 
 
 
6.  HAPNs Improve Homeowners’ Wealth Diversification 
 
As financial instruments that are separate from the mortgage, HAPNs are a pure play 
on long-term HPA, an opportunity that is only available in the market today by 
investing directly in real estate. This is an advantage of HAPNs over most SAMs, 
which combine a traditional mortgage with an HPA investment. 
 
Diversification of assets is a key investment strategy. For most homeowners, 
however, the majority of their wealth is concentrated in a single asset: their homes. 
The recent housing downturn has demonstrated the financial and emotional pain that 
such an inefficient concentration of risk can inflict. The ability to diversify 
investments is one of the major benefits that HAPN financing can offer homeowners. 
 
If affordability is the primary concern, potential homeowners should consider a 
HAPN without an HPA guarantee instead of the type that assures a 1% capital gain. 
Using the same parameters as were used in Figure 1, a HAPN with no guaranteed 
capital gain would be worth 47% of the home’s underlying value compared to 37% 
for one that assured a 1% capital gain. For some potential buyers, this extra amount 
would be just enough to make it possible for them to buy their first house. For others, 138    Home Appreciation Participation Notes    
 
it would be enough to make it possible for them to buy a larger or a better quality 
house. Households less concerned with affordability could sell, perhaps, 60% and 
retain 40% of the HPA (with no guaranteed target HPA). In this case, the 60% HPA 
would be worth about 28% of the house’s underlying value. What needs to be 
considered when choosing a HAPN is the tradeoff between a homebuyer’s need for 
affordability and his or her investment preference. 
 
 
7.  HAPNs as a Foreclosure Prevention Tool 
 
HAPNs can be a very useful tool to help distressed homeowners retain their homes. 
They can also provide financial institutions with an instrument to reduce the amount 
of losses resulting from loan defaults and to improve the quality of the assets on their 
books. Assume that a home was purchased for $300,000 with a 5% down payment 
by a household with an income of $30,000 per year. Further assume that it was 
financed with a 30-year $285,000 ARM with a 4% initial teaser rate, with an annual 
payment of $11,400 (assuming interest-only for tractability), or a PTI of 38%. 
 
Figure 4 describes what would happen in a “perfect storm” of the kind we have 
recently experienced. The rate would be reset to 6%, and the house price would fall 
by more than 10% to $270,000. The monthly payment would increase by 50%, and 
the price of the house would drop. Now the current loan-to-value ratio (LTV) would 
be 106%, and the PTI 57%. Selling the house to repay the mortgage would not be an 
option and default would most likely occur. Assuming a 45% loss-given-default rate 
in foreclosure sales, the loss to the mortgage lender would be about $128,000. 
 
Figure 4  ARM with a Stress-Induced Default 
 
¾ At Origination:
 House price = $300K
 Household income = $30K
 30-year ARM with 4% initial 
teaser rate 
 UPB = $285K
 Payment = $11.4K/yr
 LTV = 95%, PTI = 38%
¾ At Rate Reset Date:
 House price = $270K
 Household income = $30K
 ARM rate adjusted to 6%
 UPB = $285K
 Payment = $17.1K/yr
 LTV = 106%, P  57% TI =
(versus $128,000 in the case of foreclosure) between the $285,000 unpaid principal 
 
HAPNs can be part of a financing package that allows homeowners to avoid 
defaulting and remain in their homes. They can also give mortgage investors an 
alternative to the high losses associated with foreclosures, creating a win-win 
situation. The HAPN solution works as follows. The lender purchases from the 
homeowner a HAPN worth $100,000 ($270,000 times 37%) and issues a $170,000 
new fixed-rate mortgage. The lender needs to be willing to write off the $15,000 loss Cassidy, Dennis, and Yang    139 
 
stead of losing about $128,000 through foreclosure, the lender writes off $15,000 
he borrowers get to stay in their homes, which they would otherwise not be able to 
 faster recovery would be promoted because there would be fewer foreclosed 
. Conclusions 
e argue that homebuyers should have the option to decide how much of the 
he Home Appreciation Participation Note (HAPN), when combined with a 
ith HAPNs, homeowners can select how much of the appreciation they want to 
sell. For example, they could be guaranteed a 1% per year appreciation rate, or sell 
balance (UPB) of the existing mortgage and the current house value of $270,000. 
Because the new mortgage has a low initial LTV of 63%, it carries a lower interest 
rate of, for example, 6%. The homeowner uses the $100,000 received from selling 
the HAPN and the new mortgage of $170,000 to repay the existing mortgage (less 
the $15,000 written off by the lender) and ends up with zero equity. After the HAPN 
solution, the homeowner faces a $10,200 annual payment on the FRM (assuming 
interest-only) and no payments on the HAPN until sale of the house. As a result, the 
PTI after the solution is now 34% percent, which is lower than the original PTI. 
 
In
and replaces the non-performing loan on its book with a low-LTV, or low-PTI, 
performing loan of $170,000 and a $100,000 HAPN. If the price of the house 
recovers to $300,000 in two years, it will realize an 11.6% annualized return on the 
HAPN, more than compensating for the initial write-off. 
 
T
afford. They will also enjoy a risk-free positive equity of $5,400 if the house is sold 
in two years (the 1% promised HPA per year from the HAPN investors). They would 
also avoid the blemish on their credit rating that would arise if they defaulted. 
 
A
houses for sale owing to the foreclosure alternatives that HAPNs would provide. 
Also, as mentioned above, potential homebuyers would be less reluctant to buy as 
HAPN investors would be taking on their downside risks. These are two potentially 
powerful ways in which HAPNs could be used to reduce supply and increase 






investment component of their house they would like to buy in addition to the 
consumption component. By not having such a choice, many renters are locked out 
of homeownership altogether. As for homeowners, many cannot afford to buy a 
house suitable to meet their needs, and most are forced to have an investment 
portfolio with an excessive concentration of risk in only one asset: their home. 
 
T
traditional mortgage, can address these issues in an efficient way. It can provide a 
bullet mortgage with no payments until the house changes hands, for a specified 
share in the appreciation of the house, as measured by an index so as to avoid the 
moral hazard endemic with Shared Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs) that use the 
price of the house to compute the shared appreciation. 
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 can protect homeowners from the downside risk of owning by shifting this 
sk to investors that are more capable of bearing and managing it. This can result in 
0% of the price of the house for 
arious sharing arrangements, a key to housing affordability. As there would be no 
er faster. 
s they grow in popularity, they will ensure that the next down cycle will not be as 
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a variety of positive public policy outcomes. Potential buyers would be encouraged 
to make purchases during a housing downturn. By increasing demand and removing 
the oversupply of housing, HAPNs would help speed up the recovery process. 
HAPNs could further help speed up the recovery if they were used as a workout tool, 
allowing distressed homeowners to refinance into a combined HAPN and traditional 
mortgage that they were better able to afford. Thus, they would avoid putting another 
foreclosed house on an already saturated market. 
 
We estimate that investors would pay 20% to 4
v
payments on this portion of the house-financing package, renters might become 
eligible to buy, and homeowners could buy larger or better quality houses. 
 
Used as an alternative to foreclosure, HAPNs can help the economy recov
A
severe – or as long-lasting. Finally, investors and government entities can earn 
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